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Abstract
Until  recently, utility  services (telecommunications,  Next, using household data from around the world,  they
power, water,  and gas)  throughout the world were  investigate  empirically the historical  performance  of
provided  by large,  usually state-owned, monopolies.  public monopolies in meeting universal service
However,  encouraged  by technological  change,  obligations and the impact of reform.
regulatory  innovation, and pressure  from international  The results show the massive failure of state
organizations,  many developing countries are privatizing  monopolies to provide  service  to poor and rural
state-owned  companies  and introducing competition.  households  everywhere except  Eastern Europe.
Some observers  worry that even if reforms improve  Moreover,  while the data are limited,  the evidence
efficiency,  they  might compromise an important public  suggests that reforms have not harmed poor and rural
policy goal-ensuring  "universal  access"  for low-income  consumers,  and in many cases have improved  their access
and rural  households.  to utility services.  Nevertheless,  because competition
Clarke and Wallsten review the motivation for  undermines traditional  methods of funding universal
universal  service, methods used to try to achieve it under  service objectives  (cross-subsidies),  the authors  also
monopoly service provision, how reforms  might affect  review  mechanisms that could finance these objectives
these approaches,  and the theoretical  and empirical  without compromising the benefits  of reforms.
evidence  of the impact of reform on these consumers.
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2I.  INTRODUCTION
Although much of the discussion about regulatory reform and privatization of
infrastructure has focused on efficiency, distributional  issues have strongly influenced public
policy towards infrastructure  in both developed and developing economies.  Most countries
specify universal access to certain infrastructure utilities, including telecommunications,
electricity,  and piped water and sewerage,  as a public policy goal.  Specific laws and objectives
differ by country and by industry, but the general  goal is to ensure access for all people at
affordable prices.  Most universal access laws and regulations have a geographic component
meant to promote service in rural areas and a targeted component meant to help the poor afford
service.  At least in theory,  countries traditionally financed  these obligations through cross-
subsidies: low-cost and high-income  consumers paid prices above cost to subsidize high-cost and
low-income consumers, who paid prices below cost.
Some observers have worried that even if privatization and competition in infrastructure
utilities increase efficiency and improve average consumer coverage, such reforms could hurt the
poor in at least two ways.  First, new market structures, including competition,  make cross
subsidies difficult to maintain and raise the possibility that private firms will "cream skim"-
serve the most profitable customers  and ignore the unprofitable ones (i.e., poor and rural
consumers).  Second,  reforms often necessitate "tariff rebalancing"-increased  prices in order to
cover costs.  Even if such rebalancing is necessary to ensure viable service over time, higher
prices could make service increasingly unaffordable  for the poor.
This paper reviews the evidence on universal access in developing countries.  We first
discuss the rationale for universal access laws and review the different ways subsidies can be
financed and allocated,  along with the implications of those various methods.  We then evaluate
the historical effectiveness of monopoly enterprises in providing service to the poor and how
privatization has affected coverage.
We find, overall, little evidence  that subsidies have, in fact, been used to meet universal
service goals under monopoly provision:  outside of Eastern Europe, infrastructure connections to
rural areas and the poor are distressingly low.  Moreover, many mechanisms ostensibly intended
4to help the poor end up helping only the wealthy.  Subsidized service prices, for example, tend to
benefit the wealthy since they are more likely to be connected to the network and consume the
service, while poor households without direct connections receive nothing.
The empirical evidence on the effect of reforms on the poor, meanwhile, is limited.
Nonetheless,  case studies and data gleaned from household surveys reveal  some important
trends.  First, there is no evidence  that reforms tend to hurt poor or rural consumers, at least in
terms of access to service.  Even when service prices increase, the share of poor and rural
residents with connections does not generally decrease.  In many cases coverage even increases,
possibly because actual connection fees decrease  once service is no longer rationed.  Case
studies reveal that allowing entry and competition in infrastructure can dramatically improve
service to the poor-competition brings a range of price and quality options, making service
possible to regions and income levels that a monopoly provider would never have considered.
However,  it is also clear that laws and regulations must be carefully considered to ensure
access to the poor.  In particular, rules that appear to help the poor at first glance may, in fact,
only help maintain monopoly profits.  Firms (public and private), for example,  often claim that
they need some form of monopoly rights in order fund universal service obligations.  Often these
claims are self-serving, meant simply to block competition and bolster profits, not to help the
poor.  Competition,  on the other hand, does break down the ability to cross-subsidize  service.
Countries therefore must turn to other methods to fund those who simply cannot afford service
priced at cost when society believes everyone must be connected.  If funding through general tax
revenues is too difficult or costly, countries may consider, for example, universal service funds
to which all firms contribute and from which they all may draw when providing service to the
poor or to high-cost areas.
II.  WHY DO COUNTRIES PROMOTE  UNIVERSAL  SERVICE?
Universal service policies are typically justified through a combination of three factors
(Cremer et al. 1998a; b).  First, externalities related to the consumption of infrastructure services
might make it economically efficient to subsidize prices for low-income consumers.  Second,
infrastructure services might be 'merit' goods.  Finally, political factors or regional development
5goals may induce government to transfer resources to rural or low-income constituents.  This
section discusses these issues in turn.
Externalities
The most common justification for subsidizing infrastructure is that there are positive
externalities associated with consuming some services.  Positive externalities imply that the total
benefits to the service exceed the benefits to the individual who receives the service.  In other
words, society benefits by more than does the individual recipient.  If the private marginal cost of
service exceeds the private marginal benefit, then individuals will consume less than the optimal
amount since the total  marginal benefit may exceed the costs.  The externalities  argument for
subsidies is stronger in some infrastructure sectors than in others, with sewerage and piped water
the most likely candidates, telecommunications  less so, and only weakly, if at all, in electricity
and gas.
The case for positive externalities necessitating subsidies is probably strongest for
sewage removal and treatment.  Improperly treated sewage can pollute the environment and
spread disease to people other than those who produce the waste-especially  if households
dispose of their waste in public facilities  (e.g., public waterways, parks, or roads).  Further, if
society values the individual health benefits associated with improved sewerage more than the
individuals do-either because individuals underestimate  the cost that communicable diseases
have on the rest of society or because they are unable to fully assess the health risks associated
with poor sewerage-there might be additional  scope for subsidies.
It is also plausible that access to piped water has health benefits.'  If society as a whole
benefits more from an individual's improved health than does the individual, the individual may
I In practice, the evidence  for this is somewhat mixed.  For examnple,  Esrey (1996) finds that health benefits (in
terms of diarrhea, child health and child weight) from improved sewerage are greater than the health benefits of
improved water in Africa, Latin America and Asia.  Further, although he does find some benefits associated with on-
site (i.e., in house or compound) piped water, he finds no benefit from access to 'intermediate'  facilities (i.e., public
taps, hand pumps or wells).  Jalan and Ravillion (2001) find that piped water reduces the prevalence  and duration of
diarrhea for children in India.  However,  they found that the benefits largely bypassed poor families and families
with poorly educated women.  They interpret their results to suggest that public action to promote health knowledge
and reduce poverty should be combined with subsidies for infrastructure access.
6undervalue piped water.2 Consequently, if piped water is a normal good and the health benefits
associated with piped water are greatest for low levels of consumption  (e.g., water for drinking
and cleaning), it would probably be reasonable to focus these subsidies on low income
households by subsidizing basic access (e.g., through public standpipes or single household taps
either indoors or in courtyards).  However, if, as suggested by Esrey (1996), piped water only
improves health outcomes when combined with improved access to high quality sewerage (i.e.,
flush toilets or water-seal  latrines) then subsidies for basic access might have only modest health
externalities.
In telecommunication services, "network externalities"  mean that the benefits a new
consumer accrues from connecting (the private benefits)  are less than the total benefits to
society, since everyone on the network benefits when an additional person connects.  Because
the private benefits from subscribing are less than the total benefits, individuals may not face a
strong enough incentive to subscribe, thus requiring subsidies to induce subscription.  However,
ignoring for now the crucial question of whether subsidies actually successfully promote access,
the argument that network externalities justify subsidies does not necessarily hold up under
closer inspection.3 First, even if the benefits to the new subscriber are less than the total benefits,
the private benefit may still exceed the cost.  Second, because its services become more valuable
when more people are connected, the firm can capture some of the benefits from network
externalities.  Consequently, although network externalities are external to the individual, they
are not necessarily external to the firms providing the service, potentially removing the need for
subsidies.  In other words, network externalities by themselves do not necessarily imply
telephone under-subscription and a need for subsidies.
2Note that to the extent that health benefits are internalized (i.e., that the costs of poor health are primarily borne by
the individual or household that becomes sick) and that individuals  are informed about the potential health costs of
consuming untreated water, the health externalities associated with access to piped water are likely smaller than the
total health benefits.
3See Cremer (1998b) for a more complete  discussion of this issue.
7Merit Goods
Even if infrastructure  services generated no externalities,  some services might be 'merit
goods'-goods  and services that society simply believes everyone should have.  A policy
decision that certain goods and services are more important than others for people to consume
may come from a belief that society functions better when everyone has access to a minimum set
of services or a concern that individuals are unable to accurately assess the private benefits of
consuming these services.4 If society is more concerned about consumption of merit goods than
it is about the overall level of utility attained by poor individuals, subsidies for these goods might
be preferable to direct monetary transfers  (since people may choose to spend cash transfers on
something other than the service society intended).
That some infrastructure  services are merit goods and that society must ensure their
provision is easily justified-people in cold climates will die without heat, for example.  But the
justification is less clear in other sectors, and it is not at all clear why universality is legally
mandated in some sectors but not others.  For example, why do so many countries have laws
mandating universal access to telecommunications but not, say, health care?  Universal service
laws in telecommunications,  it turns out, do not have their roots in the desire to ensure telephone
access to all people: instead, they originated with a desire by the Bell company in the United
States in the early twentieth century to stifle competition.  "Universal service" did not mean that
everyone should have a telephone,  but that everyone who did should have a Bell telephone
(Mueller 1997).  In other words, in telecommunications universal  service was meant to preserve
monopoly profits, not to ensure service to everyone.  As a result, laws to promote universal
service in telecommunications  have tended to benefit monopolists instead of consumers.
Understanding the origins of these laws in the various  sectors can lead to a clearer understanding
of where universal service laws are justified and, where they are justified, the best ways to
achieve their goals.
4For example, it is  sometimes argued that people might not fully appreciate the benefits  of consuming clean water if
they are unaware of the costs associated with consuming polluted water or unable to fully assess the risks associated
with doing so (Shirley and Menard 2002).
8Nonetheless,  economics has nothing to say about what should  be a merit good, and a
good deal of evidence suggests that many countries consider some goods and services provided
by network industries, most notably heat and clean water, to be merit goods.  Estache et al.
(2001) note that pressure groups often demand access to utility services,  suggesting that they
believe those demands might have more political resonance than would demands for cash
transfers.  These groups appear to perceive that society values consumption of infrastructure
services more than it values alternate uses of income by low-income households.  In addition,
vulnerable groups are often guaranteed access to utility services, suggesting that society wants to
ensure some level of access independent of income.  Federal health legislation from the 1930s
prevents water companies in Mexico, for example, from completely disconnecting non-paying
residential customers (Haggarty et al. 2001).  In the telecommunications  sector, many countries
have explicit policies of promoting 'umversal access'  to telecommunication  services-although
these policies often remain unenforced.  For example,  Madagascar has a policy of providing a
phone in each village, Zambia has a policy of providing telephone booths in public places (e.g.,
schools and clinics), and Kenya has a policy of providing a phone within walking distance of all
residences (International  Telecommunications Union 1998, Table 4.5).6  Legal requirements and
explicit policies designed to guarantee or promote access to specific services suggests that utility
services (especially water) are seen as more important than other goods or services.
Politics  and regional  development strategies
Government might wish to subsidize poor or rural consumers for political reasons or as
part of a development strategy.  For example, it may wish to subsidize service to the urban poor
or to rural consumers because these groups have disproportionate political influence or to
transfer resources to their supporters.  To the extent that this promotes  either efficiency or equity
for the reasons outlined above, these transfers might appear relatively attractive.  However, if
subsidies are driven primarily by political reasons, they can end up hurting rural and low-income
International Telecommunications  Union (1998, Table 4.5) lists universal access policies  in 22 developing and
transition economies.
6 In practice, however,  many of the countries  included in the table had not put any legal obligations upon the
operator to actually provide access in line with the stated policies (International Telecommunications  Union  1998).
9urban households, who may have little political influence.  In this situation, wealthy households
might benefit from tariffs set below cost, while poor households, who often remain unconnected,
get nothing.  As discussed below, studies from several developing countries have found that
subsidies often benefit middle class and rich households while having little impact on low-
income groups.
Politics often affect the distribution of subsidies even when subsidies were originally
intended to promote equity.  Once subsidies are introduced, they are often expanded to cover
increasingly large portions of the population.  For example,  Boland and Whittington (2000) note
that most water supply utilities subsidize much higher levels of water consumption than is
necessary to meet basic needs.  They note that although a household with five members would
only need to consume between 4 and 5 cubic meters per month to meet intemationally cited
standards for basic water use, 15 of the  17 water utilities in Asia for which they had data
subsidized more than this level of consumption,  and five utilities subsidized over 20 cubic meters
per month.  In other words, the biggest beneficiaries of the subsidies were large consumers, who
are more likely to be wealthy.  Further, they note that users reach the highest tariffs at only very
high rates of consumption-for example, about 80 times basic needs for a family with five
members in La Paz, Bolivia (Boland and Whittington 2000).
In summary, efficiency,  equity, and politics all explain the common practice of
subsidizing infrastructure services to low-income and rural consumers, though the strength of
these arguments varies considerably across services and countries.  Justifying universal service,
however, is usually easier than implementing it.  The next sections detail methods of financing
and distributing universal service subsidies.
III.  FINANCING UNIVERSAL  SERVICE OBJECTIVES
When society believes that everyone is entitled to a minimum set of services, subsides
may be necessary.  This section reviews methods of funding universal service obligations.  These
methods include cross-subsidies-the  most common approach when a single firm provided
service-and newer methods more consistent with competition and liberalization, such as
universal service funds and auctions.
10Cross Subsidies
Under monopoly provision (whether state- or privately-owned),  cross-subsidies were the
primary way of funding universal  service obligations.  Cross-subsidies imply that some users are
charged prices above cost in order to subsidize other users who are charged prices below cost.
Cross-subsidies have several problems.  First, they are inherently inefficient-by separating
price from cost they distort consumption and investment decisions.  Second, they are typically
not transparent,  making it difficult to determine who receives subsidies and who funds them.
Third, they do nothing to encourage service to high-cost regions or to the poor since the
existence of monopoly profits from one group does not induce the firm to provide service to
an7other group (Brook and Smith 2000).  Whenever any class of users is charged prices below
cost, suppliers will have little incentive-or,  if the enterprise has cash-flow problems, ability-to
serve these users.  Consequently,  although subsidies will increase users' incentives to obtain
service, they decrease the suppliers' incentives to serve them.  Fourth, to make matters worse,
most cross-subsidy programs were not carefully designed to meet expansion goals in the first
place (Chisari et aL  1999), and therefore it is not surprising that, as we will see below, they have
been largely ineffective.
Even when subsidies can, in principle, promote efficiency, using cross-subsidies  to pay
for them may not be efficient.  In fact, if positive externalities are present at all consumption
levels, it might be inefficient to cross-subsidize service to low-income consumers by charging
high-income consumers prices above cost.  Although this policy would encourage low-income
consumers to consume more of that service-if infrastructure services are ordinary goods-the
higher prices would discourage high-income consumers  from consuming the same service.
Depending upon the relative price elasticities, cross-subsidies might therefore either increase or
decrease total consumption of that service, with a similar impact on efficiency.
Despite the problems of cross subsidies, it is possible that they could be more efficient
than other methods of raising funds in many developing countries.  While lump-sum transfers
from general tax revenues are, in theory, the most efficient means of subsidizing the people
society wishes to help, the tax and transfer systems in developing and transition economies are
themselves  often distortionary and inefficient.  For example, if countries rely heavily on tariffs or
11export taxes, redistribution through cross-subsidizing infrastructure  prices might not be less
efficient than redistributing income through the tax and transfer system (Cremer et al. 1998a; b).
Despite the possibility of the relative efficiency of cross subsidies in certain
circumstances,  to the authors'  knowledge no general equilibrium  studies of developing countries
have compared the relative inefficiency of the two methods of redistribution and, therefore,  it is
difficult to assess these claims.  Further, despite this uncertainty,  some policies such as
restricting competition in telecommunications,  a service used by relatively few low income
households in most developing countries (see Table  1), in order to allow a monopoly provider to
cross-subsidize consumption,  are likely to be highly distortionary even in relative terms.
Nonetheless, we will return to this issue below when discussing universal service funds-a
method of funding service to the poor in the presence of competition.
An elusive goal: non-distortionary,  inexpensive, and competitively neutralfinancing  mechanisms
The disadvantages of cross-subsidies,  however, do not change the fact that-even where
competition is likely to reduce prices-some sort of intervention is probably necessary to
achieve full coverage of low-income households, especially in high cost areas.  For example,
demand in some villages might be too low to support the cost of installing a payphone without
subsidization.  If low-income households are unwilling to pay the full cost of infrastructure
services,  subsidies might be required to ensure full coverage of vulnerable groups.  Given that
the empirical evidence that suggests that some low-income households in some countries  appear
to have limited willingness-to-pay for some infrastructure  services, and that competition will
make internal (firm-level) cross-subsidies difficult to maintain, governments will need to find
new ways of financing service to low-income and rural households if universal service is to be a
goal of public policy.  Financing mechanisms should strive to be non-distortionary, inexpensive,
and competitively neutral; that is, they should not distort consumption and investment decisions,
should keep the cost of raising the funds low, and should not benefit one firm at the expense of
others.
Mechanisms to support universal service are competitive neutral when one or several
firms do not benefit or suffer relative to others in the industry.  Non-neutrality  would arise if one
firm were obliged to provide universal service and raise funds for it while others were exempt
12from these requirements.  For example, in some cases, incumbent firms may end up with an
advantage over potential competitors if they receive subsidies or are allowed to maintain
monopolies over certain services (e.g.,  international service in the telecommunications sector) or
in certain regions in order to meet universality conditions.  In other cases, the incumbent could
be disadvantaged  if it is required to serve high-cost areas or low-income people while new
entrants can choose to serve the most profitable customers without having to serve other less
attractive customers.
Unfortunately, these policy goals are not entirely consistent with each other and present a
difficult policy problem.  It is not possible to simultaneously minimize distortion, expense, and
ensure absolute competitive neutrality.  And the point of universal access is not those three
objectives; it is to maximize the number of people connected to the network.  Regulators and
policymakers  should thus think of the problem as maximizing access subject to some maximum
acceptable level of consumption and investment distortions and expense.
Two methods are typically proposed as ways to finance universal  service obligations:
through the country's general taxation system or through a universal service fund (USF).
Economists typically suggest that subsidies should be financed through the general tax and
transfer system and several developing countries have developed programs along these lines.
For example, Argentina provides tariff subsidies to pensioners-a direct payment of $13.50 to
each person who receives the minimum pension in order to pay for gas, electricity,  and water
(Chisari and Estache 1999).  Although in theory this is the most efficient way to provide
subsidies, there are practical problems associated with it.  Taxation and redistribution systems in
developing countries tend to be notoriously inefficient  and ineffective;  raising and distributing
money through those systems are thus likely to be expensive relative to other methods (Chisari et
al. 1999).  Consequently, when this is the case, it may make more sense to fund service to low-
income households and high-cost areas through the firms that provide service.
While taxing some services  and firms to support others is another form of cross-subsidy,
competition requires mechanisms that support multiple firms.  Universal Service Funds (USFs)
are just such mechanisms.  All firms can be required to contribute to a universal service fund,
and all firms that provide service should be eligible to receive funds from it.  In theory,  a USF
13provides a wider tax base and potentially reduces the potential for 'cream skimming'(Cremer et
al. 1998b).  USFs also make the financing mechanism more transparent, less costly, and more
competitively neutral than cross-subsidies (Intven and Tetrault 2000).  A practical problem with
these mechanisms, of course, is that someone must still determine who is eligible to receive
subsidies and how large they should be.
How large  should subsidies be?
One approach for determining the appropriate  level of subsidies is to auction them; that
is, firms can competitively bid for subsidies.  In a fair bidding process with multiple bidders,
firms will end up the smallest subsidy necessary for them to provide service.  Auctions can be
especially useful in rural areas with little or no existing service.  Chile and Peru were among the
first to implement this method, giving license to the operators that agreed to serve areas  for the
smallest subsidy (Cannock 2001).  In Chile, the average winning subsidy from 1995-1999 was
about half the maximum subsidy offered, while in Peru it only about one-quarter the subsidy
offered (Intven and Tetrault 2000).  These experiences have two important implications.  First,
the idea of auctioning subsidies is not merely a theoretical pipe dream-it has been successfully
implemented  in developing countries.  Second, they reveal that the subsidies necessary to serve
remote locations are probably far lower than monopolists had previously claimed.  As long as
regulators lack information on the true costs of providing service to remote areas-and
regulators will always have less information than the firms-auctions  can be an effective way to
determine the true costs of providing service.
IV.  WHO RECEIVES SUBSIDIES?
An important issue once funds are raised is how to distribute them most effectively to
those in need.  Another related question is how to identify who should benefit from the subsidies.
As discussed above, universality laws typically have two components:  subsidies to high-cost
(typically rural) areas and to the poor.  Each objective presents its own challenges  and, as it turns
out, each mechanism to achieve the goal has its own unintended consequences.
14Rural areas
In developed countries,  subsidies have tended to focus more on high cost, mainly rural,
areas, with less emphasis on supporting the poor.  Crandall and Waverman  (2000) estimate that
in 1998, the United States spent close to $2 billion subsidizing telecommunications in rural areas
and only about $400 million subsidizing telecommunications  for the poor ("lifeline" and "link-
up" programs).  Subsidies for high-cost urban and rural areas  are also common in developing
countries.  For example, geographic price averaging-mandating  uniform prices across the
country-is common in telecommunications  and postal services almost everywhere in the world.
Although these subsidies are sometimes explicit (e.g., direct subsidies for providers in
rural areas), subsidies are often implicit, with a single company provide service and charging a
uniform price across different regions regardless of cost.  For example, in CMte d'Ivoire, a single
(private) monopoly provides water services to over 400 towns, charging a uniform tariff.  The
main justification for this arrangement is that, in theory, it allows the company to subsidize
service in high-cost small towns through the profits it eams in Abidjan, the largest city in CMte
d'Ivoire (Menard and Clarke 2002a).7 Similar arrangements  are relatively common in the water
supply and sanitation sectors in Africa: Water Utilities Partnership (2000) reports that out of 48
countries where information was available, a single national company provided water supply
services in 26 countries and a single company provided sanitation services in 25 countries.8
As discussed above, one problem with subsidizing service in high cost areas by keeping
prices below cost is that while low prices will generally increase demand in these areas, they will
simultaneously reduce providers'  ability and incentive to serve those regions.9  Even worse,
potential competitors have no incentive to serve high-cost areas if they are forced to charge low
prices to everyone who happens to live there regardless of their willingness and ability to pay.
7Estimates from the late 1980s suggest that the long-run marginal cost of a cubic meter of water was about four
times higher in the rest of the C6te d'Ivoire than in the largest city, Abidjan (World Bank 1990).
8  Of course, cross-subsidies  are possible between high and low-cost areas even with regional companies and some
national companies  charge different prices in different regions.  However, in general,  cross-subsidies  are harder to
observe and easier to provide when there is a single company providing service to the entire country.
9 Note that this will be true for both cash-strapped  state-owned utilities and profit maximizing  regulated private
15The result of a policy of geographic price averaging can easily be no service or only limited
service.
There are many examples from developing countries where cross-subsidies  have had this
effect.  For example, Wellenius (2000) notes that in the  1980s nearly 400,000 Brazilian farmers
and rural cooperatives were willing to pay the full cost of obtaining telephone service, but the
monopoly provider was not allowed to charge them more than it charged urban customers, with
the result that the firm provided no service in these areas.  Similarly, Menard and Clarke (2002a)
note that the national water supply enterprise in C6te d'Ivoire expanded service in the low-cost
area (Abidjan) far more rapidly than it expanded service in higher cost secondary centers in the
late 1980s and early 1990s.
Subsidies for high cost areas are problematic for both efficiency and equity reasons.  Any
program that redistributes wealth between groups will increase the welfare of the group receiving
the subsidy at the expense of the other group. Cremer et al (1998a;  1998b) show that traditional
methods of universal service provision in the telecommunications  sector have been net welfare
reducing.  In addition to being inefficient, mechanisms  to support high cost areas do not
necessarily promote equity.  Unless low-income households happen to be concentrated in high-
cost areas and have infrastructure  connections, they will not benefit from subsidies  for high-cost
areas.  For example, in a study of universal service in the telecommunications  sector in the
United States, Rosston and Wimmer (2000) find that cost-based programs  do a poor job of
targeting subsidies to low-income households.  Even though rural poverty is a serious problem in
many developing countries, the extremely low level of infrastructure coverage  in rural areas (see
Table 2) makes it highly unlikely that poor households will be the main beneficiaries of
redistribution to rural areas.
Targeting  the poor
In addition to subsidies for rural areas, universal service laws typically also aim to make
connections to the poor affordable.  One problem with reaching this goal is finding ways to
identify those eligible for subsidies.  Several mechanisms  can be used to target the poor, ranging
utilities.
16from the very precise to the very broad.'0 Each has its own advantages and disadvantages in
terms of precision,  cost, and unintended consequences.  Common methods include identifying
households and neighborhoods,  and using "block tariffs" where initial usage is charged at lower
rates than higher usage.  Subsidies targeted at the poor can be much more effective at increasing
the number of people connected than subsidies for entire regions.  Eriksson et al (1998), for
example, find no evidence that geographically based subsidies affect telephone coverage in the
United States.  In contrast, they find that targeted programs-that is, programs meant to help
people who would have trouble paying for service-seem to positively affect coverage.  They
conclude that targeted programs are much more effective at increasing network connections than
are geographically based subsidies.  The next sections discuss various methods to target the poor.
Targeting  Households
One common method of providing subsidies is to base them on the socio-demographic
characteristics of the household.  For example,  in Chile, households receive subsidies based on
the size and composition of the household, occupation and education of household head,
household assets, income, and characteristics of the dwelling.'  Although using household
characteristics to target subsidies can precisely identify the poor, the mechanism has several
drawbacks.  First, it is expensive.  Foster et al. (2000)  estimated that it could cost about US
$10/household  to have social workers  collect adequate information to identify low-income
12 households  in Panama.  This could become very expensive  in low-income countries since these
interviews would need to be performed every few years.  The cost of data collection depends,  of
course, on the detail of the information collected-for example, it would be far less costly to rely
on observable characteristics  of the house (especially since characteristics  of the house might
change less frequently than socio-economic  characteristics of the occupants of  the house) rather
0 Foster et al. (2000) discuss this issue  in greater detail.
The actual process of assigning subsidies, which are paid directly to the water companies within each region who
then subtract the amount from household bills is complicated,  involving allocating  subsidies first between regions
based on household income in the region and then, within regions, between municipalities based on a points system.
See Shirley et al. (2002)  for a complete description.
12 The criteria they identified included education level of household head, materials  for housing construction and the
presence of other infrastructure  services.
17than on details that would necessitate  a household interview.' 3 The drawback is that less data
collected decreases the precision of the targeting.  Second,  it might be difficult to collect accurate
data on household characteristics when interviewees know that their answers will affect the price
they pay for infrastructure  services.  Problems with collecting accurate data are likely to be
magnified in countries where corruption is a problem.
Targeting  Neighborhoods
An alternative to basing subsidies on the socio-economic  characteristics of the household
is to base them upon the socio-economic characteristics  of the neighborhood as a whole.
Although this method relies upon some knowledge of socio-economic characteristics of
households within the neighborhood, it could often be applied using data from a census or other
household survey without having to perform household interviews.  Even if recent census data or
other household level data is not available, this method will still generally be less data intensive
than interviewing every household applying for connections.  Although in principle the approach
could be used for both metered or unmetered connections,  in practice it has generally been used
for unmetered households.1 4
One drawback of this approach is that it will generally target households less precisely
than would household surveys-some wealthy households living near poor neighborhoods will
receive subsidies while some poor households living in wealthy neighborhoods will not (Foster
et al. 2000).  For exaxnple, Foster et al. (2000)  found that if subsidies were targeted towards
urban households in Panama in extreme poverty by paying subsidies for water use to all
household in zones where more than 50 percent of the population were in extreme poverty and
where telephone coverage was below 30 percent of the population, only 6 percent of households
in extreme poverty would receive subsidies and that 31 percent of subsidies would be paid to
13 For example, in the l990s in Buenos Aires, Argentina,  unmetered residential households (which accounted for
most households) were billed for water and sewerage based upon the location of the property, the area of  the
property, the area of property with construction on it, the type of construction (six categories)  and the age of  the
property (Alcazar et al. 2002a).
14 For example,  this approach was used for water supply for unmetered properties in Mexico City in the early 1990s
(Haggarty et al. 2001) and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
18households not in extreme poverty. 15 Further, targeted subsidies based on census data become
more imprecise between censuses, especially when they take place infrequently.  This source of
imprecision is likely to be an especially large problem in fast-growing cities in developing
countries.  A second problem is that subsidies based upon geographic location are often opaque.
This makes it easy to manipulate subsidies  for political reasons, a problem that might also be
problematic in countries where corruption is high.
Block Tariffs
A final way of subsidizing infrastructure  services,  at least when service is metered, is
through block tariffs.  Under this system, users are charged  a low rate for the first units of
consumption and progressively more for additional consumption.  For example, users might be
charged a low rate for initial units of electricity each month, but progressively more for
additional kilowatts.  The idea is that if infrastructure  services are normal goods (i.e., poor users
tend to consume less than wealthier users), then block subsidies will be targeted to low-income
households.  Although used in many sectors, these tariffs are especially common in the water
sector in developing countries.  For example, 20 of 28 utilities in Asia that used volumetric
charges used block tariffs.'6
While block tariffs are inexpensive to administer and benefit poor people who are
connected to the network, they face many problems.  First, everyone who is connected-poor
and rich-receives  the low rate on initial usage, meaning that some portion of the subsidy will go
to high-income households.  Further, when the initial block is large, middle-income households
might actually benefit more than low-income households.  Consider, for example,  a two-part
block tariff with the initial rate set below marginal cost and the higher rate set above marginal
cost.  Under this scenario, households that consume the full allocation at the initial rate will
15 Foster et al. (2000) note that changing eligibility criteria would increase the number of households in extreme
poverty that receive  subsidies but would also increase the households not in poverty receiving subsidies.  Similarly,
Estache et al. (2002) found that most beneficiaries of a similar plan in Colombia were middle class, not  poor.
16 Data from Asian Development Bank (1993) cited in Boland and Whittington (2000).  Boland and Whittington
(2000) suggest that one of the main reasons  for the popularity of block tariffs is that multilateral  donors,
international financial and engineering consultants,  and water sector professionals  encourage their use.
19receive the largest subsidy.  Since, in practice, the initial blocks are often quite large (as
discussed above), low-income households who consume relatively modest amounts might
actually receive smaller subsidies than middle-income households who consume the full amount.
Second, these tariffs can, perversely,  even hurt the poorest households  (Boland and
Whittington 2000; Whittington 1992).  In the water sector, households not connected to the piped
water grid often buy water from neighbors who are connected.  These neighbors, because they
supply many households, purchase large amounts of water, meaning that they are likely to far
exceed the initial, subsidized, block.  They will pay a high average price for water, and will
charge non-connected families who buy from them accordingly.  As a result, the poorest
households, who are more likely to share connections or buy water from neighbors, can end up
paying the higher rate while high-income users with single house connections pay the lower rate.
The possibility that block tariffs  end up hurting the poorest is not merely theoretical.
Whittington (1992)  found that relatively high-income users in Kumasi, Ghana paid the lowest
average price for water (0.25-0.29 cedis per gallon in 1989), while relatively poorer households
paid higher average prices (0.32-0.36 cedis per gallon).  Finally, large households will tend to
pay a higher average price than small households, since they generally consume more.  To the
extent that household size is a poor proxy for per capita income, subsidies will be misdirected.
V.  INCORPORATING  UNIVERSAL SERVICE  INTO REFORMS:  REGULATION,  PRIVATIZATION,
AND ACCESS
When low-income households have low willingness-to-pay for infrastructure service,
especially in sectors where externalities  arise from universal coverage (e.g., public health
externalities  associated with water supply and sewerage),  it is important to consider ways to
boost coverage among low-income households  and in high cost areas without losing the
efficiency benefits associated with privatization and increased competition.  In this section we
discuss several issues including the privatization process, the role of regulators in setting quality
standards, ways to encourage service providers to provide services that are affordable for low-
income households, and how to cross-subsidize service after the introduction of competition.
20Incorporating  universal  service in the privatization  process
Although privatization itself could help or hurt low-income households, the privatization
process can be designed to positively impact access.  Most notably, licenses  sold to private
investors can mandate certain types of investment, including to increase access in low-income or
rural areas.  Although additional obligations included in the license will reduce the price an
investor is willing to pay for a once state-owned firm, these price reductions need to be weighed
against the positive impact on policy goals.  Further, price reductions arising from such
obligations, assuming a fair bidding process, would be the implicit subsidy that would have been
necessary to achieve the policy objective.  For example, in Mexico, Telmex was required as part
of its privatization to install payphones in 20,000 rural areas over a five-year period to meet the
policy goal of ensuring some telephone access in all villages with at least 500 residents
(Wellenius 2000).
Although price regulation is one important aspect of regulation, many regulations  also
target quality.  Although quality standards typically exist when public operators provide service,
private operators might be more affected by quality regulation both because privatization  is often
associated with the establishment of new regulatory authorities and because private operators  are
less able to ignore quality standards.  Regulators and policymakers are generally tempted to
promote very high quality standards and engineering and design specifications  are typically
imported from advanced industrialized  countries (Baker and Tremolet 2000; Smith 2000).  As a
result, service may be costly, and affordable only to the elite.  Further, since the existing
infrastructure may have focused on large-scale operations, providers, especially foreign owners
from developed countries, might not offer low-cost options.  While high-income households
probably value high quality service (i.e.,  service similar to standards  in industrialized  countries),
low-income households might prefer more flexible quality standards, especially if they are
unable to afford high-quality/high-cost  service.  For example, if  postal regulations mandate daily
delivery everywhere, then costs of service in rural areas will be higher than they would be
otherwise (Cremer et al. 1998a), which will need to be financed either through higher prices or
through general tax revenues.  In sum, allowing people to decide the levels of price and quality
should improve economic outcomes-for example, low-income households might prefer a low-
21quality telephone line, or a telephone that only receives calls, to an expensive high quality digital
line or to no service at all.
Rate rebalancing, subsidies and  competition
Although reforms,  especially those that increase competition,  might lower the cost of
service and, in so doing, reduce the need for subsidies, it also makes it more difficult to cross
subsidize service.  If competitors entering the market generally try to serve the most profitable
customers first ("cream-skimming"),  the profits needed to subsidize unprofitable  areas will
disappear and rates might need to be rebalanced,  with some prices rising towards cost and others
falling.  Consequently, low-income consumers  might be hurt even if reform leads to lower
average pnces.
Although this is a theoretical possibility, there are reasons to doubt that rate rebalancing
due to increased competition will pose as serious a problem as some observers have suggested.
For example,  in the telecommunications  sector, while tariff rebalancing has often led to increases
in local residential tariffs, which were kept artificially low under monopoly provision, it is not
clear that this has harmed low-income consumers.  First, households benefit from low prices for
local service only if  they have a telephone-something that is relatively uncommon among low-
income households in most developing countries.  Even when penetration is high, it has not been
demonstrated that the poor value local service more highly than long distance service.  For
example, in the United States, rate rebalancing seems to have positive benefits for the vast
majority of households since long distance prices have fallen by far more than local prices have
risen (Wolak 1996).  Combined with evidence that competition substantially improved
coverage, this suggests that the net impact on low-income households was positive even with
rate rebalancing.
It is also important to consider the impact of technological change when thinking about
the impact of competition on prices.  Even if competition appears to negatively impact low-
income households in the near-term due to rate rebalancing, competition can affect technological
change and thus prices, in the medium- or long-term.  New technologies provide new options for
serving rural and remote locations, potentially lowering the costs of serving some high cost
areas, reducing the need for subsidies.  For example, while it may have been costly to string
22wires over long distances, fixed wireless systems may allow rural telecom service at relatively
low cost.  Especially in the telecommunications  sector, competition may allow creative entrants
to provide service in ways the incumbent never imagined.  Barring competition can prevent these
advances  from ever appearing.
One final point is that although many subsidies are focused on usage prices, it might be
more appropriate  to focus upon connection fees, especially in countries where coverage among
low-income households is initially low.  While usage prices were often low, connection prices
have often been quite high-and in many cases, actual connection prices are much higher than
listed prices when bribes are required to actually get service.  While long waiting lists for service
demonstrate that there is demand for service even at high prices, extremely high connection
charges make a mockery of any policy intended to connect the poor.  In Nigeria in 1999, for
example, the connection charge for a telephone line was $210 (Onwumechili  2001), high even by
standards for industrialized countries, and even higher considering that per capita income in
Nigeria is about $260 (World Bank 2002a).  Since coverage is generally far higher among high-
income households,  and considering that low usage prices (e.g., block tariffs) only benefit
connected users, focusing on connection fees is attractive since it will benefit non-connected
households, many of whom are relatively low-income.
VI.  AN  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  HISTORICAL  UNIVERSAL  SERVICE  PROVISION  AND  THE
EFFECTS OF LIBERALIZATION
Opponents of liberalization worry that reforms will hurt the poor even if they improve
efficiency.  If new entrants are interested in providing service only to profitable high-income and
business consumers, competition might force the incumbent provider to either abandon cross-
subsidies or be left serving only unprofitable low-income and high-cost consumers.  Further,
critics claim that competition will erode monopoly profits, forcing governments to find new
sources of funds to finance access for high-cost and low-income  consumers-something that
could be very difficult in developing countries with inefficient and distortionary tax regimes. 17
17 In line with this thinking, a recent report on liberalization in the telecommunications  sector suggests, "as trends
toward privatization and liberalization of basic telecommunications  services accelerate  worldwide,  concerns about
universal service,  particularly rural service,  are increasingly raised among policymakers,  user groups and industry
participants.  This concern stems from the possibility that, when the state relinquishes ownership  and management
23The implicit assumption behind these arguments  is that countries have successfully managed to
promote access for vulnerable groups and to target cross-subsidies  towards them prior to
reforms.  With the exception of Eastern Europe, the evidence suggests that monopolies  have not
used subsidies to serve the poor.  In this section we use household datasets from around the
world to investigate how well monopolies have served rural and low-income consumers and how
those consumers  have fared under liberalization.
Evaluating access by the poor to infrastructure utilities is difficult as there is little
consistent data on the subject.  Cross-country data on telecommunications  and electricity (such
as those from the International Telecommunications  Union and the US Energy Information
Agency, respectively),  for example, do not track connections by income group or regions of
countries.  Databases kept by utility companies themselves  do not generally provide the
information needed to assess the impact of privatization on the poor (G6mez-Lobo  et al. 2000b).
Even if the companies are willing to make these lists available, they typically have information
only on numbers of customers  and do not collect detailed information on the socio-demographic
characteristics of households.'8 Moreover, for obvious reasons, utility companies  generally do
not have detailed information on informal or illegal connections.
The only way to get a consistent picture of access by the poor to infrastructure is through
household surveys.  Such surveys will generally have greater information on the socio-economic
characteristics of households and are less likely to omit individuals with informal or illegal
connections.  Unfortunately,  household surveys are usually not designed to measure
infrastructure  use, meaning that they typically have limited information.'9 Further, it can be
difficult to find household  surveys with similar information for years both before and after
of telecommunications  networks, and when competing private operators seek to gain maximum profit,  service
requirements  in costly areas will be overlooked" (Pyramid Research 1997).
18 Gomez-Lobo et al. (2000b) note that this remains true even when the water company has a special tariff for
vulnerable households,  since the criteria for qualification rarely correspond  closely to objective  definitions of low-
income or disadvantaged households.
19 Gomez-Lobo et al. (2000a;  2000b) provide several recommendations  that might make surveys such as the Living
Standards Measurement  Surveys [LSMS] more useful for analyzing infrastructure reforms.
24reforms took place.20 Consequently,  even case studies often have only limited information on
the impact of reform on the poor.
To address this gap in our empirical understanding of the subject, we exploit the
MEASURE DHS+ Demographic and Health Surveys (henceforth called the "DHS survey") to
glean relatively consistent cross-country information.21 Since this survey provides comparable
information on a relatively large number of countries over time, especially in Africa, it allows us
to compare coverage among low-income households in reforming and non-reforming countries
and to look at how coverage has changed after reform.  The main drawbacks to these surveys are
that they contain only limited information on coverage and, since data on income is not
available,  education level of the household head must proxy for income.  In particular, we
assume that households headed by someone with no education tend to be poor, while households
headed by someone with at least a secondary education tend to be higher-income.22
Historical  Evidence: Have cross-subsidies  supported  the poor?
Despite purported attempts to subsidize services to low-income and high-cost users and the
maintenance of state-owned or regulated private monopolies to ensure that cross-subsidies  are
possible, there is little evidence that these attempts have been successful.  In general, coverage of
rural and low-income urban households is very low-considerably lower than higher income
households-especially in low-income countries in Africa and Latin America.  Figure 1 and Table 1
20 Since it often takes several years for surveys collected for other reasons to be made available to researchers other
than the researchers who performed the survey, it can be difficult to analyze recent reforms using publicly available
data.  Further, there are relatively few easily accessible, publicly available household surveys with detailed data on
infrastructure use for developing countries for recent years.  Since most reforms are quite recent, this makes it
difficult to get 'post-reform'  data.
21  These household surveys,  funded by USAID, have been carried out around the world primarily as a tool for
measuring changes in health status and the effectiveness of health-related initiatives.  More information is available
from http://www.measuredhs.com/.
22Although education of household is an imperfect proxy for household income or consumption, it tends to be
highly correlated with the variable of interest.  For example, in a simple regression of household expenditures on
five education dummies representing education level of household head for a sample of households from Abidjan,
Cote d'Ivoire, each dummy variable is statistically significantly different from the next level.  Further, the difference
in expenditure levels appears large-average household  expenditures for households with heads with no education
was CFAF 1.3 million, compared to CFAF 2.4 million for a households with heads with secondary education or
higher.
25show coverage for urban households headed by males with a secondary education or higher and no
education in the late 1990s, while Figure 2 and Table 2 shows similar coverage data for urban and
rural households.
Several patterns-generally consistent with those observed in Komives et al. (2001  )-are
evident.23 First, urban households in Africa and Latin America were generally more likely to have
electricity or piped water than they were to have a telephone or a flush toilet (see Table 2).  In both
regions (and in Europe and Central Asia), urban households were more likely to have electricity
than piped water and more likely to have flush toilets than telephones.  However, there was some
variation from country to country-for example in 7 of the 21 African countries, households were
more likely to have water connections-than electricity connections.  Another pattern is that urban
households in both low and middle-income countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia were more
likely to have infrastructure connections than households in Africa and Latin America.  Although
urban households in Europe and Central Asia were more likely to have electricity than other
infrastructure  services, the pattern for other services was less clear than for Latin America or Africa.
In general, households headed by individuals with secondary educations or higher were far
more likely to have infrastructure connections than households headed by individuals with no
education (see Figure  1), with the difference especially large in low-income countries in Africa and
Latin America.  In low-income countries in Africa, about 80 percent of urban households headed by
an individual with a secondary education had access to electricity,  63 percent had access to piped
water either in their house or yard, 20 percent had a telephone, and 38 percent had a flush toilet (see
Figure 1).  In comparison, only 32 percent of urban households headed by individuals with no
education had electricity, 27 percent had piped water and only 10 percent had a flush toilet.
Telephone coverage among urban households in Africa headed by individuals with no education
was especially low-less than 2 percent on average and less than 1 percent in most countries (see
Table  1).  Although coverage was higher in low-income countries in Latin America, the basic
pattem was similar.  The differences in coverage were not due to differences in only a few
countries.  For electricity, piped water and telephones,  coverage was lower-and in most cases
23 Komives et al. (2001) use data from 15 countries  from the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Study
(LSMS) surveys.
26much lower-for houses headed by individuals with no education than it was for households headed
by individuals with a secondary education or higher in all low-income countries in Africa and Latin
America for which data were available (see Table 1).24
In middle-income countries in Latin America,  similar patterns were observed for electricity,
flush toilets, and telephones, although, on average, urban households headed by individuals with no
education were slightly more likely to have access to piped water than urban households headed by
individuals with a secondary education or higher.  Europe and Central Asia appears different, with
higher overall coverage in most sectors and less noticeable differences between households with
heads of different education levels.
Overall, this suggests that cross-subsidies have been relatively ineffective in targeting
service for poor households.  Several empirical studies this.  For example, even the subsidy
scheme used in Chile, which was based on household characteristics and has been perceived as
quite successful (see, for example, G6mez-Lobo et al. 2000b) has failed to-target low-income
households very effectively.  Only one-third of household receiving subsidies in 1996 were in
the lowest quintile (Shirley et al. 2002) and about 23 percent of subsidies go to households with
income higher than the median (G6mez-Lobo  2001).  Similarly, Walker et al. (2000) estimated
average monthly subsidies for piped water for consumers with different incomes in six cities in
Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, and Venezuela, finding that the subsidies appeared to benefit
rich and poor consumers to similar degrees in Nicaragua,  Panama, and Venezuela.  In El
Salvador, they found that all consumers  appeared to be overcharged,  although poor consumers
appeared to be less overcharged than high-income consumers.  In addition, Whittington (1992)
found that an increasing block tariff for water in Kumasi, Ghana resulted in the poor paying
higher average prices than better-off households.25 Finally, Waddams-Price  (2000) lists several
examples, including kerosene subsidies in Ecuador and Indonesia, electricity subsidies in
24  In three (of twenty-one) countries in Africa, households headed by individuals with no education were about as
likely to have flush toilets as households headed by individuals with a secondary education.
25 One reason for this is that under the block tariff scheme used in Ghana, poor households tended to share single
connections meaning that they ended up paying the highest rate, while wealthier households had their own
connections putting them in lower consumption brackets.
27Yemen,  and public transport and water subsidies in Hungary, where  subsidies failed to
effectively target the poor.
Historical  evidence: Have cross-subsidies  supported rural  areas?
The data presented above only demonstrate that coverage of the poor is very low for most
infrastructure services,  suggesting that subsidies have not been effectively targeted.  We can
explore somewhat more directly the question of whether subsidies have benefited rural areas.  In
this section, we first compare urban and rural coverage rates across countries, and then compare
by sector structure.
In addition to differences in coverage  for low and high-income households, there are
similar differences between coverage in urban and rural areas in most developing countries (see
Figure 2).  Once again, rural coverage was generally lowest in low-income countries in Africa.
For example, about 47 percent of urban households  in Africa had electricity, 37 percent had
piped water,  18 percent had flush toilets and 6 percent had telephones.  In comparison,  only 7
percent of rural households had electricity, 4 percent had piped water, 1 percent had flush toilets
and 0.3 percent had telephones.  In almost half of the countries in Africa, less than 1 in  1000
rural households had a telephone and in only one country (Zimbabwe) did over 1 in 100 rural
households have a telephone.  Although some households might have access to telephones
outside of their home, it is highly likely that many of households do not have any access to
telephones-it was estimated that by 1999 nearly 75 percent of the world's population had never
made a telephone call (Onwumechili 2001).
Although coverage rates were higher among rural households in Latin America than they
were in Africa, the basic patterns were similar (see Figure 2).  Very few rural households  in the
two low-income countries  in Latin America for which data was available had electricity,  piped
water, telephones or flush toilets, with coverage especially low for telephones  and flush toilets.
Although coverage appears higher in middle-income  countries in Latin, especially for electricity
where over 50 percent of rural households had coverage (see Figure 2), coverage  among rural
households is far lower than among urban households.
28Dnce again, the countries in Europe and Central Asia for which data were available
generally appeared to have significantly higher coverage for rural households than similar
countries in Latin America and Africa (see Figure 2).  In particular, coverage for electricity was
higher than 90 percent in rural areas for all three countries  for which data were available
compared to close to 100 percent for urban areas.  However, coverage for other services-
although generally higher than in similar countries in other regions-was far lower in rural areas
than in urban areas.
We can also test somewhat more directly whether cross-subsidies tended to be used to
fund high-cost areas.  In particular, we know in which countries a single firm provides water in
all urban areas and in which countries  service is provided at the local or state level.  Moreover,  in
these countries the capital city tends to be the largest city with the highest concentration of high-
income consumers.26  If cross-subsidies were used to support coverage in high-cost areas, we
would expect to see less variation in coverage between the capital and other urban areas in
countries with a single water firm since that firm would be able to use income from the capital to
fund water provision elsewhere.
Table 3 shows coverage in African capital cities and all urban areas by sector structure
when service is provided by one firm throughout the country and organized at the sub-national
level.  The table yields two interesting results.  First, coverage-in the capital and in all urban
areas-in countries with a single provider is, on average, lower than in countries where provision
is organized at the sub-national level.  This result is consistent with the notion that competition
improves service,  even if it is only benchmark competition.  Second, coverage  outside of the
capital city relative to coverage in the capital is not, on average, higher in countries in Africa
where the water supply is organized at the national level than it is in countries where the water
supply is organized at the local level.27 This result suggests that cross-subsidies have not been
used to support service provision in high-cost areas.
26 In every sector and for almost all the countries for which DHS data were available,  infrastructure  connections
were more common in the capital than they were in urban areas outside of the capital.
27 'Me mean difference in coverage between the capital city and other urban areas is statistically insignificant for the
countries for which data is available  (see Table 3).  This remains true when Nigeria, where  state governments are
29In summary, although maintaining public (or regulated private)  infrastructure  monopolies
is often justified by suggestions that this is necessary in order to ensure than low-income and
rural households can obtain connections, there is little evidence that it has been successful in
most developing countries.  In the late 1990s, coverage for households headed by individuals
with no education  and for rural households was generally significantly lower than for households
headed by individuals with secondary education and for urban households in most developing
and transition economies for which data was available.  These patterns were especially
noticeable in low-income countries  in Latin America and Africa.
Effects of  Privatization  and Competition
The fact that subsidies did not appear to serve rural and poor consumers  does not by itself
imply that reforms will automatically benefit these groups.  Although on the one hand case-study
evidence suggests that public monopolies have often been overstaffed,  inefficient and lacked the
resources needed for investment, on the other hand tariffs have often been heavily subsidized
from general government revenues  and companies  have often cross-subsidized certain consumers
or services.  The net impact that reform has on coverage will therefore depend upon whether it
removes constraints on investment (supply) and how it affects prices paid by low-income
consumers (demand).  If coverage is low because enterprises in developing countries lacked the
resources needed to expand the system, then low-income consumers might benefit from reformns
even if they result in higher prices.  If coverage of low-income households is low because the
poor have low willingness-to-pay  rather than because service is rationed, however, then, ignoring
any impact that reform has on quality, reform will benefit the poor only if it results in lower
prices.
Prior to reform, water utilities in developing countries, which were mostly publicly
owned, often charged prices far below costs (see, for example, World Bank 1994).  Many case
studies have noted that the poor financial performance of many public utilities, combined with
poor fiscal situation of governments, resulted in utilities having insufficient financial resources to
responsible for water supply,  is excluded from the group of countries where local governments are responsible for
water supply.
30finance investment and maintenance.  As a result, utility companies  heavily rationed service.2 8
When services are rationed (i.e., when many households want service but are unable to get it),
low-income households might be especially unlikely to get service  as several market and non-
market mechanisms direct service towards relatively wealthy and politically-connected
individuals.
First, houses connected  to the system will generally command higher sales prices or rents
that non-connected households.  People willing or able to pay the highest sales prices or rents
(i.e., high-income households) will be more likely to acquire residences with connections.
Second, bribes and other side payments are often necessary to get a connection when service is
rationed.  Again, wealthier individuals will be the ones most likely to get a connection regardless
of the official tariff rate.  Although these is little empirical evidence at this household level,
Clarke and Xu (2002) find evidence for enterprises that is consistent with this hypothesis.29
Finally, high-income  households will generally have greater political power than other
households and might be more willing to make campaign donations or informal payments to
politicians to ensure that infrastructure services are provided in high-income neighborhoods first.
Consequently, when services are rationed, we might expect low-income households to be less
likely to receive service even if they are willing to pay official tariffs and connection fees.
Addressing the question of why the poor tend not to be connected to infrastructure
utilities is crucial since full cost recovery has been a cornerstone of  infrastructure reforms. Cost-
recovery, it was hoped, would allow utilities to become self-supporting rather than having to rely
on government subsidies.  In fact, given the poor performance of many governments in providing
subsidies in a consistent way-and in many countries of even paying their own utility bills-full
28 For example, on water supply, see the case studies in Shirley (2002), especially Menard and Clarke (2002b) and
Alcazar et al. (2002b), and the case studies in Savedoff and Spiller (1999).
29 Clarke and Xu (2002) find that firms that are more profitable pay higher bribes to infrastructure  enterprises than
less profitable enterprises do.  They note that this is consistent with the 'speed money'  hypothesis,  which suggests
that bribes operate as a price mechanism ensuring that those most willing to pay gain access to infrastructure
services.  There is a large literature on hedonic pricing that suggests that rents are higher  for houses with
infrastructure  connections (see, for example, North and Griffin  1993).
31cost recovery was often seen as a pre-condition for introducing private sector participation.30 If
low-income households are generally willing and able to pay for infrastructure connections then,
even if  prices increase, reforms that remove constraints on investment and allow non-connected
households to connect to the system will benefit non-connected households who were previously
unable to get connections.  In contrast, if low-income households are only willing to pay
relatively modest prices,  full cost recovery might not be consistent with universal  service goals
without massive cross-subsidization.
In the telecommunications  sector, the sector on which most cross-country empirical work
has focused, there is strong evidence that reforms that increase competition and privatize state-
owned utilities increase service availability.3 1 Almost without exception, cross-county empirical
research in both developed and developing countries has found that competition increases the
number of telephone connections (Li and Xu 2001; Petrazzini  1996; Ros  1999; Wallsten 2001a).
The evidence on privatization is less conclusive,  with some studies finding that privatization is
associated with improved coverage (see, for example, Ros  1999) and others finding that it has
little impact (see, for example,  Wallsten 2001 a).32 The evidence from cross-country studies is
generally consistent with the experience documented in country case-studies,  which have often
found that reform increases penetration  and reduces retail prices (see, for example,  Galal and
Nauriyal  1995; Wellenius  1997).
These results are not surprising when considered in historical context.  In the late 19'h and
early 20th century in the United States, Mueller (1997)  found that telephone service expanded at
five percent per year under a Bell monopoly and 40 percent per year under competition.
Similarly, Wallsten (200 lb) found that telephone penetration and rural service in early 20th
century Europe increased more quickly under competitive regimes than under monopoly
provision.  The recent experience  following reform has been similar.  Mueller (1997)  found that
30 See, for example, Menard and Clarke (2002a;  2002b) and Clarke, Menard and Zuluaga (2002).
31  In part the large amount of research on telecommunications  reflects the better availability of cross-country data
for developing countries.  For example,  several studies have used the data collected by the International
Telecomnmunications  Union.
32 Li and Xu (2001)  find that share-issue privatization appear to have a positive imnpact on coverage,  but find no
evidence for other types of privatization.
32the telephone penetration increased after the  1984 AT&T divestiture, and that the growth rates
were highest among low-income  groups and in regions with low telephone densities.33
When privatization and liberalization result in price decreases  and service expansion,
low-income households should benefit from reform; low-income households with connections
will benefit from lower prices and low-income households who connect to the system either due
to price decreases or to decreased rationing will also benefit.34 Even non-connected households
might benefit indirectly if the drop in tariffs affects prices charged by resellers (e.g., prices
charged by water vendors or at payphones).35 In contrast, when privatization  and liberalization
results in price increases or the regularization of unofficial or illegal connections (which
effectively  increases prices for these consumers from zero to the official tariff), the impact on
low-income households is less clear.  Although price increases will generally hurt low-income
households that already have connections, increases in coverage will benefit those households
who are able to get connections.  That is, if privatization and sector liberalization remove
constraints on investment that were the result of either the poor performance of a public utility or
of prices being set below cost, those households who were unable to get connections under
public ownership might benefit despite price increases.
However, it is important to note that increases in coverage following reform might not
benefit consumers of all income levels.  If the price increases cause some households  to
disconnect, something that might be common among low-income households with low
willingness-to-pay,  disconnected households will lose from reform.36 If many middle- or high-
income households willing to pay high prices for utility services are able to connect due to the
removal of investment constraints, while a smaller number of low-income households disconnect
due to the price increases,  low-income households might suffer even if total coverage increases
33  Mueller (1997) and Gillet (1994) both cited in Barros and Seabra (1999).
34Households might also benefit from changes  in service quality.
35 Water vendors on-sell water from the piped system in many countries (see, for example, Collignon and Vezina
2000).
36 For example, nearly one-third of water connections  in Conakry, Guinea,  were inactive due to non-payment five
years after large price increases  that followed the introduction of private sector participation in 1989 (Brook Cowen
1996).
33(i.e., if more middle and high-income households connect than low income households
disconnect).
While household data that covers countries and times where reforms have occurred is
rare, the DHS data allows us to test the effects of reforms in several sectors, countries, and time
periods.  In particular, we compare access in African countries with public and private water
operators, public and private telecommunications providers in Africa and Latin America,  and
time-series comparisons of the. effect of private sector participation in the electricity sector in
Latin America.
Cross-country  evidence from the DHS+ surveys comparing countries with public and
private operators does not generally support the assertion that public operators are better at
serving low-income households than private operators.  Table 4 compares coverage  for low-
income households in the mid-late 1990s for countries with public enterprises in the water supply
sector, countries that had recently introduced private sector participation (within two years of the
survey date) and countries that had had private sector participation for many years.  On average,
coverage among households headed by an individual with no education appears slightly lower in
countries with public operators (25.4 percent) than it is in countries with established private
operators (30.6 percent).  Coverage for households  headed by individuals with no education was
higher in CMte d'Ivoire than in 11 of 17 countries with public operators and higher in Guinea
than in 9 of 17 countries.  Conclusions are similar when comparing countries based upon the
share of connected households with no education as a percentage of the share of connected
households with a secondary education (i.e.,  essentially controlling for the general development
of the sector).
Cross-country evidence on access to telecommunications  services in Africa and Latin
America leads to similar conclusions (see Table 5).  Coverage for households headed by
individuals with no education is similar in African countries with public operators and privatized
operators.  In Latin America,  coverage actually appears lower in countries with public operators
than it is in countries with private operators; coverage among households headed by individuals
with no education is lower in both countries with public operators than in any of the four
countries with privatized operators.  In summary, there is little evidence that public ownership
34benefits low-income households in terms of coverage  and in some cases coverage appears lower
among households headed by individuals with no education in countries with public operators.
Time-series evidence from the DHS+ surveys is also generally consistent with the
hypothesis that private sector participation does not harm, and may actually help, low-income
households.  Figure 4 presents some evidence on the impact of reform in the electricity sector in
Latin America on service to poor households for the four countries  in Latin America for which
pre- and post-reform data was available.  In three of the four cases, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru,
prices, which were significantly lower than similar prices in OECD countries before reform,
increased significantly.  In the fourth country, Bolivia, which had the highest prices before
reform, prices fell slightly.  Coverage for urban consumers, which was already high prior to
reform, increased following privatization in all four countries.  Since this occurred despite
increased prices in three of the four countries, this suggests that capacity was constrained prior to
reform.  Coverage also increased for the poor in three out of four cases, despite large price
increases in two of the three countries.  Although total coverage  increased slightly in
Colombia-it was very close to  100 percent even before reform-coverage  of households with
heads with no education fell slightly.
These results are interesting for several reasons.  First, despite large price increases in
three of four countries, coverage actually increased in all four countries, suggesting that supply
constraints played an important role in blocking service to the poor under public ownership.
This is consistent with cross-country evidence from the telecommunications  sector.  In a recent
paper, Ros (1999) found that higher residential subscription prices were correlated with higher
coverage in a sample of 110 developed and developing countries.  He interprets this as indicating
that supply-side constraints were more important than demand-side  constraints.  Second,
increases in coverage for the total urban population might not always imply increased coverage
for the poor.  In Colombia, although coverage in urban areas appears to have slightly increased
overall following reform, coverage appears to have fallen slightly among households headed by
individuals with no education.
Figure 3 presents similar evidence for the effect of private sector participation  in the
water supply in Africa.  In December 1995, following an unsuccessful reform of the public
35sector water utility in Senegal, the Senegalese Government signed a lease contract with
Senegalaise des Eaux (SDE), a private sector company with SAUR international  as its majority
shareholder, under which SDE would become responsible for operations of maintenance of water
services in 54 towns in Senegal.  Since the Government was concerned about the political
sensitivity of transferring  assets to a private operator, and believed that it would have been
difficult to convince private sector companies to assume the risk associated with debt service, the
Government opted for a lease contract (Kerf 2000).37  Since one of the main goals of the reform
was to make the utility financially self-sufficient, modest price increases of about 2.4 percent per
year were planned between  1996 and 2003.
Following the introduction of private sector participation the number of connections in
Dakar appeared to increase modestly-from  about 135,414 in 1995 to  147,212 in 1997 to
157,429 by 1999.38  The expansion was accompanied by modest price increases-due to social
and political considerations prices were only increased by about 3 percent per year in the early
years following reform (Kerf 2000).  Despite the price increases, coverage appears to have
increased for both high and low-income households.  Between  1992 and 1997, coverage for
urban households headed by a male with secondary education or higher increased by about  1.4
percent per year while coverage for urban households headed by a male with no education
increased by about 3.2 percent per year (see Figure 3).  These increases compare favorably with
the annual increases observed in other African countries between the early and late  1990s.  Of
the eight countries with public utilities where similar data was available, coverage grew more
slowly for low-income households  in seven of the eight countries and more slowly for high-
income households in all eight countries.
Although these results suggest that private sector participation can benefit the poor even
when reform is combined with modest price increases, the benefits are not automatic.  For
example, in 1992, a thirty-year concession contract to supply water and sanitation services in
Buenos Aires was awarded to a private company.  The contract was awarded to the consortium
37 In addition, the private operator agreed to undertake  some investment in the distribution network.
38 Data is from World Bank files.
36that agreed to the largest price reductions for connected customers.39 Although it seems
plausible that consumers would benefit when contracts are bid based upon price reductions, the
benefits of the large price decreases  accrued to mostly middle and upper income customers who
were already connected at the time of reform.  In contrast, connection fees, which included the
cost of expanding the secondary network, remained high-between  $1,107 and $1,528 (Alcizar
et al. 2002a).  Since average monthly income in the poorest  sections of the city was only
between US$200-245 per month, many poor households were unable to afford the high cost of  a
connection.  Consequently,  despite the decreases in monthly subscription rates and expansion
targets based upon geographical location with poor areas prioritized,  it appears that reform
initially failed to benefit poor households as much as originally intended.40 This eventually led
to a renegotiation of the contract, under which the cost of new connections was passed onto both
new and existing customers through an additional surcharge-the Universal Service and
Environment Improvement Fee (SUMA).
In summary, the evidence from cross-country comparisons of  reformers and non-
reformers and from comparisons before and after reform fails to support the hypothesis that
reform harms low-income consumers.  In many cases the poor seem to benefit,  at least in terms
of being connected to the network.  It is important to note, however,  that the impact of reform
will vary from country-to-country and city-to-city.  In countries and cities where coverage is
already very high among poor households, or where many poor consumers have informal or
illegal connections,  significant price increases and regularization of customer accounts might
lead to a reduction in coverage among low-income households even if total coverage increases.41
In contrast, in countries where service was heavily rationed prior to reform, privatization and
39This discussion draws upon Alcazar et al. (2002a), which provides a detailed discussion of the political and
economic factors concerning the Buenos Aires concession and the welfare impact on poor and middle class
consumers.
40 Water and Sanitation Program (2001) notes that the contract tried to enforce service provision to poor areas
through geographical expansion targets.
41  An additional point is  that if low prices and high number of connections meant that the utility needed to
subsidized from general tax revenues, the overall impact on low-income households would also depend upon how
reform affected these subsidies.
37liberalization might result in increased coverage  for low-income households, even if prices
increase.
VH.  CONCLUSIONS
Most countries have an explicit policy goal of promoting universal access  to certain
infrastructure utilities.  When service was provided by monopolies (typically state-owned, but
occasionally private), these obligations were, in theory, funded through cross subsidies: high-
income and low-cost consumers were charged prices above cost to finance service to low-income
and high-cost consumers, who paid prices below cost.  While this arrangement sounds simple, in
practice it has not worked well.  Cross-subsidies have often been poorly targeted  and have
typically failed to reach poor consumers.  Although low prices might increase demand for
infrastructure  services from poor and rural consumers, they also lead to supply-side distortions
that might lessen or nullify their impact.  Moreover,  the opaque nature of cross subsidies also
makes it difficult to determine who pays and who benefits from them.  In practice, there is strong
evidence that public and private monopolies failed to ensure access for rural and low-income
urban consumers,  especially in Africa.  Indeed, the relatively wealthy appeared to benefit from
subsidies far more than the poor.
Despite these failings, many observers worry that reforms such as privatization and
competition in infrastructure  utilities could harm the poor, making cross subsidies unsustainable
and raising prices beyond the reach of the poor.  The limited evidence  that exists suggests that
overall this has not been the case.  Most likely this is because, outside of Eastern Europe, state-
owned monopolies did a miserable job of directing cross-subsidies  to poor or rural consumers.
Even when official tariffs rise under rate rebalancing, the real cost of connecting may fall,
allowing more poor people to connect to the networks.
Moreover,  entry and competition allows entrepreneurs to discover and try new methods
of providing service to poor and rural areas, generating a wealth of service, price, and quality
options.  Maintaining state-owned (or regulated private) monopolies  might stifle innovative
solutions to providing access to the poor.  In fact, if competitive entry and privatization  increases
efficiency,  areas and customers that monopolists  found unprofitable might either become
profitable or, at least, require smaller subsidies.  Some regions and users thought to be unwilling
38or unable to pay for service have turned out to be profitable customers, as evidenced by creative
entry mechanisms from new competitors.42
Nonetheless, not everyone is willing or able to pay the cost of utility services, meaning
that some regions and users will require subsidies if society wants them to be connected.
Reforms mean that new methods are necessary to raise subsidies, including competitively neutral
financing mechanisms,  such as universal service funds and subsidy auctions.  While reforms
present  a challenge to ensuring access to the poor, in light of the almost complete failure of
service provision to the poor under monopoly provision in many developing countries, reforms
also provide an opportunity to completely rethink the role of subsidies and of how to ensure
access by the poor.
42 For example, condominial  sewerage systems reduce costs over traditional  systems by using smaller pipes, being
installed in shallow trenches,  and being installed under household yards rather than under roads (Komives and
Brook Cowen 1998).
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averages  (i.e., no weighting).  Income  classifications for countries are based upon classifications in (World  Bank 2002b).  Data is for all countries
in these regions for which data were available  for various years between 1994 and 2000.  See Table I for more infonmation.
45Figure 2:  Infrastructure Access for Households in Urban and Rural Areas in 1990s.
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Source:  Authors' calculations based on raw data from MEfASURE  DHS+ Demographic and Health Surveys.
Note: AFR is Sub-Saharan  Africa;  LAC is  Latin America and Caribbean;  ECA  is Europe and Central Asia.  Low are  low-income  countrics;  Middle are
middle income countries.  Income classifications  for countries  are based upon classiflcations  in (World  Bank 2002b).  Regional average are  computed as
simple averages  (i.e., no weighting).  Clasifications of urban and niral households are based upon original classifications  in the DHS+ datasets.  Coverage
implies that the household has a connection to duat service  in their house (or yard for water).  Data is for all countries in these regions for which data were
available for vario0  years between 1994 and 2000.  See Table 2 for more information.
46Figure 4: Residential  Electricity Prices and Electricity Coverage by educational attainment before and after privatization.
100%  L  - $0.16
90%-  i  t  ;  |  ]  l,  |  _  _|l  $0.14
80%-  L;  I  $0.12
70%  3  l-
60%  I  $0.10
50%  I  I  i  I  $0.08
30%  l  $0.04 I  j  ~~~~~~~~~~~~< ~~~~  $0.06
20%  I  $0.00
10%  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~$0.02
0%  r'  40
0  0  0  00  0  0a  0a
m  co  XE  o2  c
8  0 C.)
Coverage  -All Urban  Consumers  =Coverage -No  Education  +4Price(US$IkwH)
Source: Authors'  calculations based on raw data from MEASURE DHS+ Demographic and Health  Surveys and price data from OLADE.  Note: Coverage
is for urban households,  which are classified based on educational level of household head.  Comparable data was not available  for non-reformers.
Privatization is defined as privatization in any of generation,  distribution or transmission.  Similar data was not available for any non-reformers over similar
periods.
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47X  TABLES
Table 1: Access to Infrastructure  in Developing and Transition Economies for Urban Households with Heads with No Education and Secondary Education.
Per Capita  Access to Electricity  Access to Piped Water  Access to Telephone  Access to Flush Toilet
Gross
Country  Year  National  Secondary  No  Secondary  No  Secondary  No  Secondary  No
Income  Education  Education  Education  Education  Education  Education  Education  Education
Africa -Low  Income  79.8%  32.1%  62.8%  26.6%  19.8%  1.7%  38.2%  9.8%
Mozambique  1997  180  63.9%  6.8%  63.6%  11.8%  25.0%  0.4%  39.9%  2.4%
Niger  1998  200  88.0%  22.9%  70.5%  17.4%  14.6%  0.9%  22.6%  1.1%
Chad  1997  220  35.5%  5.8%  34.7%  9.6%  10.4%  0.3%  6.3%  0.5%
Burkina Faso  1998  240  85.2%  21.3%  62.2%  11.4%  34.9%  3.0%  17.8%  0.9%
Mali  1996  240  64.7%  11.1%  58.5%  9.7%  13.4%  1.0%  18.6%  1.1%
Madagascar  1997  250  83.9%  8.5%  52.3%  3.0%  9.9%  0.3%  30.7%  0.7%
Nigeria  1999  250  94.3%  67.3%  34.9%  18.3%  10.7%  0.9%  45.7%  5.3%
Uganda  1995  250  61.4%  15.5%  25.5%  3.5%  5.8%  0.0%  17.5%  0.8%
Tanzania  1999  260  91.9%  19.0%  65.9%  45.9%  35.0%  1.4%
Togo  1998  320  84.3%  21.1%  77.8%  39.5%  0.0%  0.0%
Benin  1996  350  85.5%  11.0%  86.1%  31.8%  0.0%  0.0%
Kenya  1998  350  60.9%  42.0%  71.6%  49.4%  15.4%  5.8%  58.7%  36.1%
Zambia  1996  360  87.0%  14.3%  81.4%  24.0%  82.8%  16.4%
Ghana  1998  390  94.2%  69.1%  64.7%  25.6%  14.7%  1.9%  40.4%  6.0%
Comoros  1996  410  89.6%  33.3%  52.1%  32.1%  35.4%  2.9%  33.3%  2.4%
Central African Republic  1994  440  40.4%  7.7%  31.7%  5.1%  29.9%  1.3%  27.9%  1.9%
Guinea  1999  490  76.5%  43.5%  47.0%  23.8%  14.8%  2.7%  24.7%  2.0%
Senegal  1997  530  97.7%  55.4%  91.2%  60.3%  67.4%  15.2%
Zimbabwe  1999  530  97.5%  80.8%  96.5%  85.8%  45.8%  0.0%  96.9%  97.0%
Cameroon  1998  610  97.8%  53.2%  66.0%  13.2%  16.4%  3.6%  57.4%  3.0%
C6te d'Ivoire  1994  660  95.3%  63.8%  84.4%  37.4%  78;0%  11.8%
Europe and Central Asia - Low  Income  100.0%  100.0%  86.1%  94.2%  51.9%  55.2%  45.7%  22.6%
Kyrgyz Republic  1997  470  99.9%  100.0%  86.2%  100.0%  53.4%  57.7%  49.0%  38.2%
Uzbek  1996  620  100.0%  100.0%  86.0%  88.4%  50.4%  52.6%  42.5%  7.1%
Europe and Central Asia - Middle Income  99.3%  91.4%  77.7%  77.8%  73.5%  47.7%  87.2%  77.0%
Kazakhstan  1999  1290  99.3%  91.4%  85.2%  75.5%  58.1%  22.9%  79.7%  75.5%
Turkey  1998  3150  1  _  70.2%  80.1%  88.9%  72.6%  94.7%  78.5%
48Per Capita  Access to Electricity  Access to Piped Water  Access to Telephone  Access to Flush Toilet
Gross
Country  Year  National  Secondary  No  Secondary  No  Secondary  No  Secondary  No
Income  Education  Education  Education  Education  Education  Education  Education  Education
(U S $)  _  _  _
Latin America -Low Income  97.6%  56.8%  80.6%  47.4%  39.5%  5.3%  64.2%  10.3%
Haiti  1994  270  97.6%  56.8%  63.7%  15.5%  57.0%  0.6%
Nicaragua  1998  370  99.2%  80.0%  97.5%  79.4%  39.5%  5.3%  71.4%  20.1%
Latin America - Middle Income  99.0%  85.1%  74.2%  78.4%  59.3%  15.8%  81.8%  43.9%
Bolivia  1998  1010  99.4%  82.3%  93.5%  74.7%  56.1%  8.0%  64.2%  15.4%
Dominican Republic  1996  1550  37.5%  85.9%  60.5%  20.0%  84.1%  37.4%
Guatemala  1998  1650  100.0%  75.7%  49.0%  59.0%  60.8%  2.8%  97.8%  38.8%
Colombia  2000  2080  99.9%  95.4%  98.8%  94.9%  81.2%  39.4%  98.6%  84.1%
Peru  1996  2250  95.9%  76.1%  82.7%  74.6%  38.0%  8.6%  79.2%  50.1%
Brazil  1996  4320  99.6%  96.2%  83.5%  81.1%  67.1%  37.8%
Source:  Authors' calculations based on raw data from MEASURE DHS+ Demographic  and Health Surveys.
Note:  Data are for urban households headed by males,  which are classified based on educational  level of  household head.  Coverage implies that the household has a connection to that service in their house (or yard
for water).  Income  classifications are  based upon  classifications  in (World Bank 2002b).  Data is for all countries in these regions for which data were available for various years between  1994 and 2000.  Regional
average are computed  as simple averages  (i.e., no weighting).
49Table 2:  Access to Infrastructure  in Develo  ing and Transition Economies for Households in Urban and Rural Areas
Per Capita  Access to Electricity  Access to Piped Water  Access to Telephone  Access to Flush Toilet
Gross
Country  Year  National
Income (US  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural
Africa -Low Income  47.3%  6.6%  36.9%  3.7%  5.7%  0.3%  17.6%  1.0%
Mozambique  1997  180  25.9%  2.1%  23.4%  0.6%  5.4%  0.0%  12.3%  0.1%
Niger  1998  200  36.6%  0.2%  27.2%  0.1%  3.4%  0.0%  4.3%  0.3%
Chad  1997  220  9.4%  0.1%  11.6%  0.2%  1.4%  0.0%  1.0%  0.0%
Burkina Faso  1998  240  39.8%  0.2%  25.2%  0.1%  9.5%  0.1%  3.9%  0.0%
Mali  1996  240  21.6%  0.4%  15.8%  0.6%  2.4%  0.0%  3.0%  0.1%
Madagascar  1997  250  38.1%  2.1%  17.7%  2.2%  2.0%  0.1%  7.4%  0.7%
Nigeria  1999  250  85.0%  28.2%  24.4%  3.8%  5.5%  0.2%  31.1%  4.3%
Uganda  1995  250  40.2%  1.5%  12.9%  0.1%  2.4%  0.1%  9.4%  0.3%
Tanzania  1999  260  27.4%  1.1%  48.2%  4.1%  4.1%  0.6%
Togo  1998  320  41.2%  2.5%  51.6%  3.4%  0.0%  0.0%
Benin  1996  350  34.5%  2.0%  56.5%  7.1%  0.0%  0.0%
Kenya  1998  350  47.6%  4.3%  61.3%  12.5%  9.2%  0.7%  43.6%  2.1%
Zambia  1996  360  44.2%  1.5%  47.9%  1.7%  45.9%  1.2%
Ghana  1998  390  82.5%  20.9%  41.5%  3.5%  5.3%  0.2%  18.4%  2.1%
Comoros  1996  410  52.1%  19.7%  39.5%  15.1%  9.1%  0.9%  7.7%  1.6%
Central African  Republic  1994  440  8.0%  0.3%  5.0%  0.0%  2.6%  0.0%  2.5%  0.1%
Guinea  1999  490  54.5%  1.5%  30.0%  1.2%  5.7%  0.1%  7.9%  0.2%
Senegal  1997  530  68.9%  6.0%  65.4%  7.4%  26.7%  0.8%
Zimbabwe  1999  530  87.5%  8.3%  91.0%  6.2%  16.7%  1.3%  94.1%  2.2%
Cameroon  1998  610  79.1%  22.0%  28.5%  2.9%  5.1%  0.1%  18.1%  1.3%
C6te d'Ivoire  1994  660  69.8%  13.7%  51.0%  4.1%  29.3%  2.3%
Europe and Central Asia - Low Income  100.0%  99.5%  87.4%  32.7%  52.0%  13.3%  49.7%  2.8%
Kyrgyz Republic  1997  470  100.0%  99.6%  87.4%  27.6%  53.9%  13.8%  51.6%  3.1%
Uzbek  1996  620  100.0%  99.3%  87.4%  37.8%  50.0%  12.7%  47.7%  2.5%
Europe and Central Asia - Middle Income  99.4%  93.9%  79.9%  28.3%  67.8%  44.7%  85.1%  14.8%
Kazakhstan  1999  1290  99.4%  93.9%  86.8%  23.6%  54.9%  19.6%  80.8%  4.9%
Turkey  1998  3150  72.9%  33.0%  80.7%  69.7%  89.5%  24.8%
50Per Capita  Access to Electricity  Access to Piped Water  Access to Telephone  Access to Flush Toilet
Gross
Country  Year  National
Income (US  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural
Latin America - Low Income  84.5%  20.7%  60.2%  13.5%  16.5%  1.1%  26.6%  1.4%
Haiti  1994  270  76.7%  3.9%  30.1%  1.8%  11.6%  0.1%
Nicaragua  1998  370  92.4%  37.6%  90.3%  25.1%  16.5%  1.1%  41.7%  2.8%
Latin America - Middle Income  95.6%  51.4%  78.0%  38.9%  39.7%  4.3%  67.4%  19.1%
Bolivia  1998  1010  96.2%  29.0%  88.3%  31.0%  36.2%  0.6%  45.1%  2.4%
Dominican Republic  1996  1550  58.2%  43.6%  40.8%  4.1%  64.8%  9.4%
Guatemala  1998  1650  91.4%  54.0%  59.5%  51.2%  27.1%  6.1%  71.4%  24.2%
Colombia  2000  2080  99.5%  83.9%  98.1%  50.7%  66.7%  10.3%  96.3%  58.2%
Peru  1996  2250  92.1%  17.8%  78.4%  29.6%  27.7%  0.3%  70.9%  4.2%
Brazil  1996  4320  99.0%  72.4%  85.4%  27.2%  55.7%  16.2%
Source:  Authors'  calculations based on raw data from  MEASURE DHS+ Demographic  and Health Surveys.
Note:  Classifications  of urban  and nula  households are based upon  original classifications  in the  DHS+ datasets.  Coverage  implies that the household has a connection to that service  in their house  (or yard for
water).  Income classifications  are based upon  classifications  in (World Bank 2002b).  Data is  for all  countries  in these regions for which data were available  for various  years between  1994 and 2000.  Regional
average  are  computed  as  simple  averages  (i.e.,  no  weighting).
51Table 3: Access to Piped Water in Africa where Urban Water Supply Is Provided at National and Local Level.
Access to Piped Water  All Urban as
Country  Difference  share of
Capital  All Urban  Capital
Local or State  52.40%  37.77%  14.6%  74.38%
Kenya  82.6%  61.3%  21.3%  74.21%
Madagascar  31.7%  17.7%  14.0%  55.84%
Mozambique  28.6%  23.4%  5.1%  81.82%
Tanzania  78.8%  48.2%  30.6%  61.17%
Togo  67.5%  51.6%  15.9%  76.44%
Nigeria  25.2%  24.4%  0.8%  96.83%
Natonal  42.77%  30.88%  11.9%  74.08%
Benin  98.1%  56.5%  41.7%  57.59%
Burkina Faso  27.3%  25.2%  2.1%  92.31%
Cameroon  43.1%  28.5%  14.6%  66.13%
Central African Republic  10.2%  5.0%  5.2%  49.02%
Chad  21.1%  11.6%  9.4%  54.98%
C6te d'Ivoire  63.8%  51.0%  12.8%  79.94%
Ghana  66.0%  41.5%  24.5%  62.88%
Guinea  39.6%  30.0%  9.6%  75.76%
Mali  17.4%  15.8%  1.6%  90.80%
Niger  33.9%  27.2%  6.7%  80.24%
Senegal  79.4%  65.4%  14.0%  82.37%
Uganda  13.3%  12.9%  0.4%  96.99%
Source: Authors' calculations based on raw data from MEASURE DHS+ Demographic and Health Surveys.
Note:  Coverage  is  for  urban households,  which  are  classified  based  on educational  level  of household  head.  Access  to  piped  water  implies  that the
household has  piped  water  in either their house or compound.  If coverage  for households  with heads  with  secondary education  and no education  were
equally  likely to  have  connections,  the final  two columns  would be 0%  and  0  respectively.  Information  on decentralization  is  from  Water  Utilities
Partnership (httd://www.wuvafiicaore/.  Data is for all countries in these regions  for which data were available for various  years between  1994 and 2000.
Nigeria has state-level provision of water supply.
52Table  4:  Piped Water  Coverage  for  Urban  Households  headed  by individuals  with  different  levels  of education  in
Africa.
% of Households  with Piped  No education  as
. Water  share of
Secondary  ~~Difference  secondary
Secondary  No education  ecatior
education  education
Public  62.6%  25.4%  37.2%  40.58%
Zimbabwe  1999  96.5%  85.8%  10.6%  88.91%
Kenya  1998  71.6%  49.4%  22.3%  68.99%
Tanzania  1999  65.9%  45.9%  20.0%  69.65%
Comoros  1996  52.1%  32.1%  20.0%  61.61%
Nigeria  1999  34.9%  18.3%  16.6%  52.44%
Togo  1998  77.8%  39.5%  38.3%  50.77%
Ghana  1998  64.7%  25.6%  39.1%  39.57%
Benin  1996  86.1%  31.8%  54.3%  36.93%
Zambia  1996  81.4%  24.0%  57.4%  29.48%
Uganda  1995  25.5%  3.5%  22.0%  13.73%
Cameroon  1998  66.0%  13.2%  52.8%  20.00%
Niger  1998  70.5%  17.4%  53.1%  24.68%
Burkina Faso  1998  62.2%  11.4%  50.8%  18.33%
Chad  1997  34.7%  9.6%  25.1%  27.67%
Mozambique  1997  63.6%  11.8%  51.8%  18.55%
Madagascar  1997  52.3%  3.0%  49.3%  5.74%
Mali  1996  58.5%  9.7%  48.8%  16.58%
Private Sector Participation (Recent)  61.5%  32.7%  28.8%  53.17%
Senegal  1997  91.2%  60.3%  30.9%  66.12%
Central African  Republic  1994  31.7%  5.1%  26.6%  16.09%
Private Sector Participation (Established)  65.7%  30.6%  35.1%  46.58%
Guinea  1999  47.0%  23.8%  23.2%  50.64%
C6te d'Ivoire  1994  84.4%  37.4%  47.0%  44.31%
Source: Authors' calculations based on raw data from MEASURE DHS+ Demographic and Health Surveys.
Note:  Coverage  is  for  urban households,  which  are  classified  based  on educational  level  of household head.  Access  to piped  water  implies that the
household has piped water  in either  their house or compound.  If coverage  for households  with  heads with  secondary education  and no education were
equally likely to have connections,  the final two columns would  be 0% and 0 respectively.  Private Sector Participation  includes  lease contracts  (Guinea,
C6te d'lvoire, and  Senegal). and Management  Contracts (Central  African  Republic).  Senegal  and  Central African  Republic had  PSP for one year before
survey  was  taken.  Guinea had  PSP for  10 years  and COte  d'lvoire  for  35  years.  Information  on private  sector  participation  is  from  Water  Utilities
Partnership (http://www.winafrica-ore.  Data is for all countries in these  regions for which survey data were available  for various  years  between 1994 and
2000.
53Table 5: Telephone  coverage  for Urban Households  headed by individuals with  different  levels of education  in Africa
and Latin America.
% of households with  no education as
Country  Year  telep hone  Difference  share of
Secondary  No Education  secondary
Education  education
Africa - Privatlzed  13.1%  1.7%  11.50%  12.98%
Guinea  1999  14.8%  2.7%  12.10%  18.24%
Ghana  1998  14.7%  1.9%  12.80%  12.93%
Madagascar  1997  9.9%  0.3%  9.50%  3.03%
Africa - Public  21.5%  1.7%  19.80%  7.91%
ganda  1995  5.8%  0.0%  5.80%  0.00%
Kenya  1998  15.4%  5.8%  9.60%  37.66%
Nigeria  1999  10.7%  0.9%  9.80%  8.41%
Mali  1996  13.4%  1.0%  12.40%  7.46%
Niger  1998  14.6%  0.9%  13.70%  6.16%
Mozambique  1997  25.0%  0.4%  24.60%  1.60%
Zimbabwe  1999  45.8%  0.0%  45.80%  0.00%
Chad  1997  10.4%  0.3%  10.00%  2.88%
Cameroon  1998  16.4%  3.6%  12.80%  21.95%
Central African  Republic  1994  29.9%  1.3%  28.60%  4.35%
Burkina Faso  1998  34.9%  3.0%  31.90%  8.60%
Comoros  1996  35.4%  2.9%  32.50%  8.19%
Latin America - Privatized  58.9%  19.0%  39.90%  32.26%
Colombia  000  81.2%  39.4%  41.80%  48.52%
Dominican Republic  1996  60.5%  20.0%  40.40%  33.06%
Peru  1996  38.0%  8.6%  29.30%  22.63%
Bolivia  1998  56.1%  8.0%  48.20%  14.26%
Latin America -Public  50.2%  4.1%  46.10%  8.17%
icaragua  1998  39.5%  5.3%  34.20%  13.42%
Guatemala  1998  60.8%  2.8%  58.00%  4.61%
Source: Authors'  calculations based on raw data from MEASURE DHS+ Demographic  and Health  Surveys.
Note: Coverage is for urban households,  which are classified based  on educational  level of household head.  If coverage  for households with  heads with
secondary  education  and no education  were  equally likely  to have connections,  the final  two columns  would  be  0% and  0  respectively.  Privatization
information  is provided by International  Telecommunications  Union.  All privatizations,  other than in the Dominican  Republic are recent  (i.e., within past
five years).  Data is for all countries  in these regions for which data were available  for various years between 1994 and 2000.
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